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The Supreme Court Retires Disparate Impact:
Kentucky Retirement Systems v. EEOC Validates the
Disparate Treatment Theory Under the Age
Discrimination In Employment Act
By Molly Horan*
I. INTRODUCTION
Most working Americans will someday reach the age of pension
eligibility. At this time the employee is faced with a pivotal
question: Should I continue to work or accept my pension and retire?
Regardless of the decision made by the employee, Congress has
taken steps to ensure that, if the employee chooses to continue
working, he will be treated fairly in the workplace. In 1968, the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) was signed into effect. 1
The ADEA guarantees older employees the same rights as younger
employees in the workplace and prohibits employers from
discriminating on the basis of age, when that employee is at least the
age of forty.2 Specifically, section 623(a)(1) of the ADEA forbids
employers from discriminating against individuals with respect to the
individual's compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment because of such individual's age. 3 Since the enactment
* J.D. Candidate, 2010, Pepperdine University School of Law. B.A., English
Literature, 2007, Arizona State University. Ms. Horan wishes to thank her mother
for, day or night, always being just a phone call, text message, or email away.
Enormous thanks also to Bradley Miller for his endless words of encouragement,
inspiration, and support.
1. See Rocco Cozza, Does the Theory of Disparate Liability Apply in Cases
Arising Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act?: A Question of
Interpretation, 41 DUQ. L. REv. 773, 774 (2003).
2. See id.
3. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2006) ("It shall be unlawful for an employer to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate
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of section 623 of the ADEA, the Supreme Court of the United States,
as well as lower courts, have struggled to agree on a method of
interpreting claims brought by employees under the ADEA. 4 Two
theories of liability serve as the focus of this struggle: disparate
treatment and disparate impact.5 Under a disparate treatment theory,
the employee has the burden of showing that the employer's decision
or policy was actually motivated by age. 6 Thus, under a disparate
treatment theory of liability, "[p]roof of discriminatory motive is
critical." 7 In contrast, claims brought under the disparate impact
theory involve employment practices or policies which are facially
neutral, but treat one group in a different and more negative manner
than another. 8 For claims under a disparate impact theory, proof of
discriminatory motive is not required. 9 The language of the ADEA
makes it difficult to discern which theory of liability is applicable for
claims of ADEA violations.10 As a result, courts, including the
Supreme Court, have applied the two intermittently and
inconsistently. In previous cases, the Supreme Court muddied the
debate further by issuing holdings in which both theories of liability
were found applicable.11 Similarly, in each of the Supreme Court's
most prominent and decisive ADEA cases addressing the issue of
which theory of liability should be applied, the Court issued its
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's age . ").
4. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609 (1993).
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. Id. (quoting Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36, n.15 (1977)).
8. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 609.
9. Id.
10. See RAYMOND F. GREGORY, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN THE AMERICAN
WORKPLACE: OLD AT A YOUNG AGE 19 (2001).
11. In Smith v. City of Jackson, the Court employed a disparate impact theory
of liability and in Hazen Paper the Court applied the disparate treatment theory.
See Jessica Sturgeon, Smith v. City of Jackson: Setting an Unreasonable Standard,
56 DUKE L.J. 1377, 1385-89 (2007). Furthermore, in Hazen Paper (the decision of
which was issued prior to that of Smith), the Court refused to rule as to whether a
disparate impact theory of liability is available under the ADEA. Hazen Paper,
507 U.S. at 610.
opinion without explanation or guidance as to how future courts
should interpret that opinion. 12
In Kentucky Retirement Systems v. EEOC, the Supreme Court
was afforded the opportunity to clarify, once and for all, which
theory of liability should be applied to ADEA claims. In Kentucky
Retirement, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) brought forward an action on behalf of Charles Lickteig, a
sixty-one year old hazardous worker who became disabled while
employed.13 Because Lickteig continued to work after becoming
eligible for retirement, he was not eligible to collect "disability
12. In Hazen Paper, the Court asserted that it "had never decided whether
disparate impact claims were available under the ADEA." Sturgeon, supra note
11, at 1385. After making this determination, the Court failed to analyze when and
where a disparate impact theory would be available and simply left the issue moot.
See id. Furthermore, in Hazen Paper the court adopted a disparate treatment theory
of analysis but only because the employee alleged that the employer's conduct was
motivated by age. See id. In Smith, the Court reasoned that a disparate impact
theory of liability might be available for claims of ADEA violations. Id. at 1387-
88. The Court, however, dismissed the employee's disparate impact claim and
failed to explain when a disparate impact claim of an ADEA violation would
succeed and be upheld by the Court. See id.
13. See Ky. Ret. Sys. v. EEOC, 128 S. Ct. 2361, 2365 (2008). The EEOC is a
federal agency charged with the enforcement of laws designed to prevent
discrimination in the workplace. See The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, Federal Equal Employment Opportunity Laws,
http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeo/overviewlaws.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2009).
The primary federal laws prohibiting job discrimination are: Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, Equal Pay Act of 1963, Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, Title I and Title V of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Sections
501 and 505 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
Id. The EEOC receives and handles a large number of age discrimination (ADEA)
claims each year. See The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Age
Discrimination, http://www.eeoc.gov/types/age.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2009).
For example, in 2007, the EEOC received 19,103 charges of age discrimination,
resolved 16,134 charges, and recovered 66.8 million dollars in monetary benefits
for charging parties and aggrieved individuals. Id. To file a claim with the EEOC
alleging a violation of the ADEA, an individual must file a charge with the EEOC.
See The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Filing a Charge of
Employment Discrimination,
http://www.eeoc.gov/charge/overview-charge-filing.html (last visited Feb. 10,
2009). A charge must be filed with the EEOC before a private lawsuit can be filed
in court. Id. Additionally, the individual alleging the violation must file the charge
within 180 days from the date of the alleged violation. Id.
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retirement" as a younger, non-pension eligible worker would be
under Kentucky's retirement system. 14 The Supreme Court was thus
charged with determining whether the Kentucky retirement system
prohibiting Lickteig from collecting "disability retirement" violated
the ADEA. 15  In determining whether the Kentucky retirement
system violated the ADEA, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to
make sense of the conflicting series of precedent set forth by
previous disparate impact/disparate treatment cases. 6 When issuing
its holding in Kentucky Retirement, the Court sought to limit its
holding perhaps in an attempt to avoid limiting the availability of a
disparate impact theory in future cases involving an alleged violation
of the ADEA. 17  Because the policy in question in Kentucky
Retirement was facially discriminatory and the Court upheld its
validity, the Court certified the disparate treatment theory of liability
as supreme.' 8
This case note explores the ramifications and effectiveness of the
Kentucky Retirement decision. Part II discusses the historical
background, progression, and development of the ADEA, as well as
the theories used to analyze claims under the Act. Part III outlines
the operative facts of Kentucky Retirement. Part IV dissects and
analyzes the opinions of the majority and dissent. Part V examines
the potential impact the Court's decision in Kentucky Retirement will
14. Ky. Ret., 128 S. Ct. at 2365.
15. See id. at 2364. ("The question before us is whether Kentucky's system
consequently discriminates against the latter workers 'because of ... age.').
16. See, e.g. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 604; Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S.
228 (2005); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
17. Ky. Ret., 128 S. Ct. at 2376.
18. In his dissent, Justice Kennedy states that Kentucky's retirement system is
facially discriminatory because, on its face, it treats employees differently based on
age. See Ky. Ret., 128 S. Ct. at 2372 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). He specifically
writes, "[b]y explicit command of Kentucky's disability plan age is an express
disadvantage in calculating the disability payment." Id. Justice Kennedy further
notes that previously, in accordance with the disparate impact theory, "once the
plaintiff establishes that a policy discriminates on its face, no additional proof of a
less-than-benign motive for the challenged employment action is required." Id. at
2374-75. Thus, if the Court upholds a facially discriminatory policy, like
Kentucky's retirement system, it simultaneously invalidates the use of disparate
impact and advocates the use of disparate treatment.
have on employees, employers, and the judicial system. Finally, Part
VI concludes this case note.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The first legislation to outlaw age discrimination in the workplace
was enacted by the states.' 9 Colorado was the first state to enact
anti-age discrimination legislation in 1903 followed by
Massachusetts (1937), New York (1958), Connecticut (1959),
Wisconsin (1959), and California (1961) among several others.2 0
With so many states eager to enact statutes barring age discrimination
in the workplace, why did it take federal legislators so long to enact a
similar statute? Legislation outlawing age discrimination largely
lacked public support.2 1 Such legislation often adversely affected
younger workers and similarly, because it only benefitted a select
segment of workers, many believed it was not relevant or
22important. Based on the lack of public support, Congress was
hesitant to enact legislation that would punish employers from
discriminating based upon age.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 served as the first major
step in ending workplace discrimination on a national level. Title VII
specifically prohibits employers from discriminating based upon
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.23 Title VII, however,
lacks any mention of age, thus leaving employers free to discriminate
in the workplace based upon the ages of their employees.2 4 As a
result of this exclusion and after sensing the need for investigation,
the final version of Title VII directed the secretary of labor to
19. See GREGORY, supra note 10, at 16.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id. Much of the public believed that because there were many other
programs for the elderly (including Social Security, Medicare, and Medicade),
there was no need to protect them in the workplace any more than they already
were. Id. Furthermore, because these existing programs benefitted not only the
elderly but also their families (children, spouses, grandchildren, etc.), there was
little controversy surrounding them. Id. Age discrimination statutes, however,
only benefitted the elderly worker, and because of this, many younger workers did
not support such limited legislation. Id. at 17.
23. See Cozza, supra note 1, at 774.
24. See id.
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conduct a study of factors relating to age discrimination and its
consequences.25
Secretary of Labor, W. Willard Wirtz, released his findings one
year later setting forth five basic conclusions:
1. Many employers adopt specific age limits upon those they will
employ.
2. These age limitations markedly affect rights and opportunities
of older workers.
3. Although age discrimination rarely is based on the sort of
animus that motivates racial, national origin, or religious
discrimination, it is based upon stereotypical assumptions of
the abilities of the aged, unsupported by objective facts.
4. The evidence available at the time showed that the arbitrary
removal of older workers from the workplace was generally
unfounded, and that, overall, the performance of the older
worker was at least as good as that of the younger worker.
5. Age discrimination is profoundly harmful in that it deprives the
national economy of the productive labor of millions of
workers and substantially increases the costs of both
unemployment insurance and Social Security benefits, and it
inflicts economic and psychological injury upon workers
deprived of the opportunity to engage in productive and
satisfying occupations.
26
25. See id.
26. See id. at 774-75. The study conducted by Wirtz focused primarily on the
common employer practice of setting age limits on the hiring process. See
GREGORY, supra note 10, at 18. "Thus, the original impetus for the enactment of a
federal statute barring age discrimination in employment emerged from
discriminatory hiring practices ... rather than from discriminatory terminations or
retirements of older workers." Id. Born in 1912, W. Willard Wirtz served as U.S.
Secretary of Labor from 1962-1969. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library &
Museum, Biographies & Profiles: Willard Wirtz,
http://www.jftkibrary.org/Historical+Resources/Biographies+and+Profiles/Profiles/
Willard+Wirtz.htm (last visited Mar. 24, 2009). During his time as Secretary of
Labor, Wirtz became "best known for his work toward ending and preventing
several strikes, and for his involvement in controversial railroad negotiations." Id.
Furthermore, Wirtz "supported job-retraining programs as a way to combat
unemployment, and proposed amendments such as the Manpower Development
and Retraining Act." Id. During his lifetime, Wirtz worked as a high school
teacher (1933-1934), an assistant professor of law at Northwestern University
(1939-1952), Assistant General Counsel of Board of Economic Welfare (1942-
A congressional committee concurred with Wirtz's findings and
in 1967 President Johnson signed the ADEA, which became effective
June 12, 1968.27 The newly adopted ADEA expanded Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 "in Congress's continuing effort to
eradicate discrimination in the workplace."2' Congress intended for
the ADEA "to promote employment opportunities for older workers"
by requiring employers to make decisions based not upon the age of
workers, but upon their capabilities and job performance.
The ADEA makes it illegal for an employer to fire, refuse to hire,
or take any other adverse action against an employee because of that
employee's age.3 ° In particular, section 623(a)(1) of the ADEA, the
section at issue in Kentltcl Retirement, forbids an employer to
"discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's age."-3 1 Since it became effective in
1968, the ADEA has been the basis for many age discrimination
lawsuits. 3 2 Interpreting the act, however, has not been an easy task
for the courts. Specifically, the ambiguous language of the ADEA,
and the ambiguity surrounding its development, have led to much
confusion among the courts and have led them to interpret section
623 according to two competing methods: (1) disparate impact theory
1943), Associate with the War Labor Board (1943-1945), Chairman of the National
Wage Stabilization Board (1940), a law professor at Northwestern University
(1946-1954), U.S. Secretary of Labor (1962-1969), and a partner at Wirtz & Gentry
in Washington D.C. (1970-1978). Id. His many accomplishments and experiences
have given him two decades of experience in labor law, "including hundreds of
labor management disputes." hi. Currently, Wirtz resides in Washington D.C. Id.
27. Cozza, supra note 1, at 775. In its concurrence with Wirtz, the
congressional committee "affirmed Wirtz's conclusions that 'employers generally
operated under false assumptions regarding the effects of aging in order workers,
that these assumptions led to the common usage of age barriers in the hiring
process and, consequently, that a disproportionate number of older workers were
among the unemployed."' Id. (citing GREGORY, supra note 10, at 18).
28. GREGORY, supra note 10, at 18.
2 Id. at 19.
30. See id.
31.29 U.S.C. § 023(a)(1) (2006).
3. Sec GREGORY, supra note 10, at 21.
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of liability; and (2) disparate treatment theory of liability. 33
However, before investigating the courts' uneven applications of the
two methods of interpreting the ADEA, it is necessary to determine
exactly why courts are so perplexed with the objectives and scope of
the ADEA.
A. Sources ofAmbiguity in the ADEA
1. The Language of the ADEA
As previously mentioned, the language of the ADEA, specifically
section 623, is ambiguous. This ambiguity causes courts to cast
conflicting decisions on very similar issues. An examination of the
language of section 623 seems to indicate that the prohibitions in the
statute are directed only at intentional age discrimination. 34  "The
'because of such individual's age' language ...... modifies both
prohibitions [contained in section 623 and] implies that age must be
the motivating factor for the employer's practice . . . .,3 Thus, under
this interpretation of the statute's language an employer would have
to take action against an employee based on the employees age in
order to violate the ADEA, which essentially requires intentionally
violating the ADEA.36 Others, however, have argued that this is not
33. See George 0. Luce, Why Disparate Impact Claims Should Not be Allowed
Under the Federal Employer Provisions of the ADEA, 99 Nw. U.L. REV. 437, 441-
43 (2004).
34. Id. at 442.
35. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2006)). Section 623 contains two major
prohibitions: It makes it unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual . . .
because of such individual's age" and it makes it unlawful for an employer "to
limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend
to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee because of such individual's age ... ." See Luce,
supra note 33, at 442 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)). It is thus alleged that the
"because of such individual's age" language applies to both of these prohibitions.
See Luce, supra note 33, at 442 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)). This would thus
make it necessary for an employer to have taken actions in violation of the ADEA
with the intent to discriminate. See Luce, supra note 33, at 442.
36. See id. at 441-43. Intentional age discrimination is known as disparate
treatment discrimination. See id. at 442. Under the disparate treatment theory of
liability, discrimination will be found only if the employer was motivated by age in
the correct reading of the statute. 37 These commentators have argued
that the language in the statute can be easily read to prohibit facially
age-neutral employment practices that adversely affect one age group
over another. 38 "For example, the 'otherwise discriminate' language
of § 623(a)(1) . . . seem[s] at first blush to ban certain practices
regardless of the existence of any discriminatory intent.",39 Because
the statute can be interpreted to ban intentional discrimination as well
as actions that are facially neutral but have a discriminatory effect,
courts have interpreted the statutes unevenly, applying both
interpretations to cases with very similar facts.
In addition to the language of section 623(a) of the ADEA, the
language and existence of section 623(f) has similarly given courts
pause. Section 623(f), also known as the reasonable factor other than
age exception (RFOA), which is specifically found in section
623(f)(1) states: "It shall not be unlawful for an employer.., to take
any action otherwise prohibited under subsections (a), (b), (c), or (e).
• . where age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of the particular business, or where
the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age . .
"40 The inclusion of this exception in the ADEA has led courts and
commentators to reach two very opposite conclusions. On one side,
authors and commentators have suggested that this RFOA exception
could be viewed as superfluous if the ADEA were limited to
"intentional, age-motivated decisions" since those decisions could
not be for any reason other than age.41  Thus, under this
interpretation, the disparate treatment theory of liability would render
section 623(f)(1) redundant leaving the disparate impact theory of
liability the only viable method of evaluating and determining the
making his decision. Keith R. Fentonmiller, The Continuing Validity of Disparate
Impact Analysis for Federal-Section Age Discrimination Claims, 47 AM. U. L.
REv. 1071, 1075-77 (1998).
37. Luce, supra note 33, at 442.
38. Id. at 443.
39. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. §623(a)(1) (2006)).
40. Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 128 S. Ct. 2395, 2400 (2008)
(citing 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2006)).
41. BARBARA T. LINDEMANN & DAVID D. KADUE, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT LAW 422 (2003).
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outcome of an ADEA age discrimination claim.42 Others have
suggested, however, that through the inclusion of the RFOA
exception, Congress limited the ADEA to intentional discrimination,
"because the RFOA protects all employment practices except those
based on age bias-and this would necessarily include facially
neutral criteria even if they had a disproportionately adverse impact
on older workers., 43 This interpretation is further based upon the
fact that business decisions that negatively impact older workers will
be based on reasonable factors other than age, and thus subject to the
RFOA exception, because if they were not based on other factors, the
decision would be based on age and would violate the ADEA under a
disparate treatment analysis as well.44 Based upon the indefinite
language of the RFOA exception and its ability to be interpreted in
two adverse ways, lower courts have employed both the disparate
impact theory and the disparate treatment theory with frequent
irregularity.
2. Vague Recommendations and Findings
Another cause for confusion stems from Secretary of Labor
Wirtz's investigations and his subsequent recommendations to
Congress.45 Wirtz recommended that Congress prohibit "arbitrary"
discrimination but failed to explain what scope he intended to give
the term "arbitrary."46  Although he seemed to equate "arbitrary
discrimination" with intentional age discrimination, he also found
that "age discrimination" could exist if employment actions were
taken based upon age-correlated factors as opposed to age itself.47
Thus, if Wirtz intended for the term "arbitrary" to encompass
discrimination that was not specifically motivated by age, then the
disparate impact theory would be valid.48 If, however, his use of the
term "arbitrary" was intended to exclude all discrimination that was
42. See id.
43. Id.
44. Cozza, supra note 1, at 793.
45. Luce, supra note 33, at 460.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 461.
not motivated by age, then use of the disparate treatment theory
would be necessary.4 9
B. Which Theory of Liability to Apply? Disparate Treatment or
Disparate Impact?
Since there is uncertainty about which theory of liability to apply,
courts, including the Supreme Court of the United States, have
applied both rather inconsistently. Because they believe that the
language of the ADEA parallels that of Title VII, the Second, Eighth,
and Ninth Circuits have generally found that disparate impact claims
should be available under the ADEA.5 ° Conversely, the First, Third,
Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have questioned the viability of
disparate impact claims being applied to ADEA violations.5' The
lower circuit courts are not the only judicial entities perplexed by this
issue-through its case precedent, the Supreme Court of the United
States has similarly demonstrated uncertainty in knowing whether the
disparate impact or disparate treatment theory of liability is
applicable under the ADEA.52
When the employee alleges that the employer intended to
discriminate, courts follow the precedent established in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green with little disagreement.53 In McDonnell
Douglas, Green claimed that petitioner McDonnell Douglas
Corporation violated Title VII by discharging him for reasons
allegedly motivated by race.5 4  Following the discharge, Green
engaged in a number of protests directed at McDonnell Douglas. 55 A
short time later, McDonnell Douglas advertised for a job position in
49. Id.
50. Cozza, supra note 1, at 773.
51. Id.
52. Joseph A. Seiner, Disentangling Disparate Impact and Disparate
Treatment. Adapting the Canadian Approach, 25 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 95, 111
(2006).
53. See Luce, supra note 33, at 440.
54. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 794 (1073).
McDonnell Douglas asserted that Green was discharged as part of a general
reduction in work-force. Id.
55. Id. at 794-95.
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mechanics, Green's trade.56 However, when Green applied for re-
employment, McDonnell Douglas turned him down based upon his
involvement in the protests.5 7 Green filed a complaint with the
EEOC alleging that McDonnell Douglas refused to rehire him based
on his race, which was a blatant violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.58 In order to address this allegation of
intentional discrimination and deternine liability, the Court
developed a burden-shifting procedure. 59 First, the complainant in a
Title VII trial must carry the initial burden of establishing a prima
facie case of racial discrimination. 60 Once the complainant meets his
burden, the burden shifts to the employer and the employer must
show "some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's
rejection. "61 If the employer meets this burden, the complainant then
has the burden of showing that the employer's explanation is
pretextual.62 Since its date of decision, McDonnell Douglas has
governed cases involving intentional discrimination, including cases
involving violations of the ADEA.63 Consequently, all federal courts
have essentially adopted the McDonnell Douglas framework for
claims of disparate treatment that are not based on direct evidence of
56. Id. at 796.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Luce, supra note 33, at 439.
60. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The Court explains that:
[t]his may be done by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial
minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for
which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his
qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection,
the position remained open and the employer continued to seek
applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.
Id.
61. Id. at 802.
62. Id. at 804. The Court explains that Title VII does not permit the employer
to use the complainant's race, gender, conduct, etc. as a pretext for discrimination.
Id. Thus, in McDonnell Douglas, Green had the burden of showing that
McDonnell Douglas used his involvement in the protests, in addition to his race, as
a pretext for their rejection of his employment application. See id.
63. Luce, supra note 33, at 440. The disparate treatment theory of liability
established in McDonnell Douglas "has been widely accepted without controversy
in the ADEA context." Id.
discriminatory intent." However, when it is not actually alleged that
the employer intended to discriminate, or when a facially neutral
employment practice or policy is at issue, precedent is significantly
more muddled due to the Supreme Court's irregular application of
disparate impact and the disparate treatment theories.
While courts have applied the disparate treatment theory of
liability analyzed in McDonnell Douglas to ADEA cases in which
intentional discrimination has been alleged, they are hesitant to
extend disparate treatment where a facially neutral employment
policy is at issue. This hesitancy largely stems from the precedent
established in the Supreme Court case, Griggs v. Duke Power Co..
Similar to McDonnell Douglas, Griggs involves a class action
wherein a number of black employees alleged that an employment
policy created by Duke Power Company violated Title VI. 65 The
employment policy in dispute required employees to have either
obtained a high school education or passed a standardized
intelligence test.66 To determine the outcome of this case the Court
followed the disparate impact theory of liability noting that "[t]he
Act 67 proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that
are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation."6  Thus, the
majority held that the testing requirements violated Title VII even
though the policy was neutral and no discriminatory intent was
found.69 Following the holding in Griggs, many courts, as well as
the Supreme Court, have allowed disparate impact claims to be
64. See Crone and Mason PLC, McDonnell Douglas v. Green (Standard for
Proving Discrimination),
http://www.agerights.com/cases/ussupremecourt/green.html (last visited Feb. 11,
2009). The McDonnell Douglas framework essentially establishes the burden
shifting procedure courts use to determine if a violation occurred. See id. First, the
plaintiff must establish a prima facie case for discrimination. Id. Next, if the
plaintiff can establish a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to
"articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason why the employee was
rejected." Id.
65. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 425-26 (1971).
66. Id. at 426.
67. Referring to the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
68. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431 (emphasis added).
69. See id. at 436; see also Cozza, supra note 1, at 780.
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brought under the ADEA.7 ° The Second Circuit was the first to
apply the disparate impact theory of liability to an ADEA violation
and since that application, courts have argued over whether or not
Congress, in its enactment of the ADEA, intended for claimants to
recover in the absence of discriminatory intent.7'
The seminal case that caused a large number of circuit courts to
"disavow" the disparate impact theory of liability as applied in the
ADEA context was the Supreme Court case, Hazen Paper Co. v.
Biggins.72 In Hazen Paper, the plaintiff was fired immediately
before his pension would have vested, which he claimed motivated
his employer to terminate him. 73 In deciding whether Hazen Paper
violated the ADEA, the Court engaged in an examination of the
viability of both disparate impact and disparate treatment claims
under the ADEA.74 The Court arrived at the conclusion that "[t]he
disparate treatment theory is of course available under the ADEA, as
the language of [the] statute makes clear." 75  The Court further
explained that disparate treatment encompasses the "essence" of what
Congress intended to prohibit through the ADEA. 76 This is because
when the employer's decision is totally motivated by factors other
than age, the problem of stereotypes based on age disappears, which
is the goal of the ADEA.77 Following its praise and explanation of
the applicability of disparate treatment liability to the ADEA, the
Court confused matters by refusing to state that disparate treatment
70. See Cozza, supra note 1, at 780. Application of the disparate impact
theory of liability is extended to ADEA claims on the basis of the similarity
between Title VII's language and the ADEA's language. Id.
71. See id.
72. Luce, supra note 33, at 470.
73. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 606. Hazen Paper claimed the plaintiff was fired
for doing business with competitors. Id.
74. Id. at 609.
75. Id. The language the Court referred to the phrase, "because of such
individual's age," which appears in Section 623(a)(1) of the ADEA. Id. (citing 29
U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2006)).
76. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 610.
77. Id. at 611. The Court explained that this was true even when the
motivating factor correlated with age, as pension status typically does. Id.
was the only theory of liability that could be applied to the ADEA. 78
Because the Court refused to rule on the applicability of disparate
impact liability, lower courts are still left questioning whether or not
disparate impact does in fact apply in the ADEA context.79
Rather than expanding their examination of the applicability of
ADEA disparate treatment claims, the Supreme Court further
obfuscated the matter by applying disparate impact liability in a
subsequent case, Smith v. City of Jackson.80 In Smith, the plaintiffs
alleged a violation of the ADEA after the City of Jackson revised an
employee payment plan which granted raises to police and public
safety officers and resulted in older, higher ranking officers receiving
raises based on lower percentages of their salaries than younger
workers.81 While the Court in Hazen Paper determined that the
language of the ADEA clearly made disparate treatment available,
the Court in Smith concluded that "the ADEA authorizes recovery in
disparate-impact cases comparable to Griggs" because the language
of the ADEA and Title VII is "identical," except for the substitution
of age for race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. 82 The Court
78. Id. at 610. The Court explains: "we have never decided whether a
disparate impact theory of liability is available under the ADEA . . and we need
not do so here." Id.
79. See Luce, supra note 33, at 472-73. Since Hazen Paper, the circuit courts
have split. Id. Five circuits have interpreted the Hazen Paper decision to mean
that discriminatory intent is required and have disallowed disparate impact ADEA
claims. Id. In addition, two other circuits have precluded disparate impact claims
without barring them. Id. at 473. However, three circuit courts still accept
disparate impact claims under the ADEA but they do so with little analysis. Id.
80. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005). The Court in Smith
affirmed the Fifth Circuit's ruling that the plaintiffs would be entitled to relief
under Griggs. Id.
81. Id. at 233. In Smith, the Court ultimately found that, under the disparate
impact theory of liability, the policy did violate the ADEA. Id. at 243.
82. Id. at 234. In Hazen Paper, the Court specifically stated that the language
of the ADEA makes disparate treatment available. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 609.
The Court went on to state that "[d]isparate treatment . . captures the essence of
what Congress sought to prohibit in the ADEA." Id. at 610. The Court, however,
in Smith explained that "when Congress uses the same language in two statutes
having similar purposes, particularly when one is enacted shortly after the other, it
is appropriate to presume that Congress intended that text to have the same
meaning in both statutes." Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1541. Because the Court in Hazen
Paper said the language of the ADEA makes disparate treatment cases viable and
then in Smith says the language (and its similarity to Title VII) makes disparate
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further ignored the precedent established in Hazen Paper and
emphasized "that Congress had 'directed the thrust of the Act to the
consequences of employment practices, not simply the
motivation."' 83 Clearly noticing the disparity between the holding in
Smith and that in Hazen Paper, the Court explained that because they
did not rule on the applicability of disparate impact liability for
ADEA claims in Hazen Paper, there was nothing in the Hazen Paper
ruling precluding "an interpretation of the ADEA that parallels [the]
holding in Griggs."84 The decision in Smith contrasts starkly with
the holding of Hazen Paper.85 Furthermore, "[t]he Smith decision
marks a new height of uncertainty and confusion in disparate impact
law."' 86 The Court's decision in Smith simply illustrated the point
that more than thirty years after Griggs and McDonnell, the Supreme
Court still did not understand how and when to apply either the
disparate impact theory or the disparate treatment theory. 87
Smith presented the Supreme Court with an opportunity to clarify
the proper theory of liability that should be applied to violations of
the ADEA. 88 The Court, however, simply encumbered the issue
further and again left precedent uncertain and vague and the issue
undecided. 89
impact cases viable, the issue of whether disparate treatment or disparate impact
should be employed has yet to be determined. Furthermore, by proffering
explanations and reasoning to support the viability of both distinct types of cases,
the Supreme Court contradicted itself.
83. Smith, 544 U.S. at 234 (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432). Departing from
the reasoning of the majority, Justice O'Connor, although concurring in the
judgment, disagreed with the majority's interpretation of the ADEA. Sturgeon,
supra note 11, at 1392. O'Connor examined the ADEA's text, purpose, and
legislative history and reached the conclusion that the ADEA does not allow for
recovery based on a disparate impact theory of liability. Id.
84. Smith, 544 U.S. at 238.
85. See Seiner, supra note 52, at 115.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 113-14.
89. See id. at 114.
III. FACTS
A. Background and Details of the Kentucky Retirement Plan for
Hazardous Workers
Kentucky Retirement Systems developed and, prior to this case,
enforced a special retirement plan for state and county employees
occupying "hazardous positions." 90  Ordinarily, under this plan, a
hazardous worker can receive normal retirement benefits by
following one of two routes. 91  The first route makes a worker
eligible for retirement after twenty years of service while the second
allows a worker to become eligible after only five years of service so
long as the employee has attained the age of fifty-five. 92 In order to
determine retirement benefits under either of these two normal
routes, Kentucky multiplies the worker's total years of service by
2.5% and then multiplies this figure by the final pre-retirement pay. 93
If, however, a hazardous worker becomes disabled or injured prior to
becoming eligible for retirement under one of the aforementioned
normal routes, the Kentucky retirement plan (Plan) has special
provisions. 94  If an employee has worked for five years or has
become disabled while working, then the employee is eligible to
retire immediately. 95 In calculating the retirement pay given to the
disabled worker, Kentucky uses a slightly different method than the
one applied to the two normal retirement routes. 9 6  Kentucky
calculates retirement benefits for disabled workers by adding a
certain number of years, or "imputed" years, to the employee's actual
number of years of service. 97 These imputed years will equal the
number of years it would have taken the disabled worker to become
90. Ky. Ret., 128 S. Ct. at 2364. Hazardous positions include active duty law
enforcement officers, firefighters, paramedics, and workers in correctional systems.
Id. at 2364-65 (citing KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.592(1)(a) (LexisNexis Supp.
2003)).
91. Ky. Ret., 128 S. Ct. at 2364-65.
92. Id. at 2365.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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eligible for normal retirement under either of the aforementioned
normal routes of retirement. 98 The Plan does impose restrictions on
the number of imputed years that can be added to a disabled worker's
actual years of service. 99 The Plan establishes a "ceiling" on the
imputed years, requiring them to be equal to or less than the number
of years the employee has previously worked.' 0 0
B. Charles Lickteig's Alleged Age Discrimination
The EEOC brought an age discrimination lawsuit against
Kentucky following a complaint they received from Charles
Lickteig.101 Lickteig served as a hazardous position worker at the
Jefferson County Sheriffs Department in Kentucky. 102 At the age of
fifty-five, he became eligible for retirement but continued to work.'03
At sixty-one, Lickteig became disabled and retired. 0 4 In calculating
Lickteig's retirement, the Plan calculated his pension on the basis of
his actual years of service, which was eighteen years, multiplied by
2.5% and by his final annual pay. 10 5  The Plan did not add any
imputed years to the calculation, however, because Lickteig became
disabled after he became eligible for normal retirement benefits.'0 6
Following the calculation of his pension, Lickteig complained to the
EEOC of age discrimination in violation of section 623 of the
ADEA.' O7 In filing its lawsuit against Kentucky, the EEOC noted
98. Id. The imputed years would be either the number of years necessary to
bring the worker up to twenty years of service or to at least five years of service
when the worker would turn fifty-five. Id. The plan will then use whichever
number is lower as the imputed years. Id.
99. Ky. Ret., 128 S. Ct. at 2365.
100. Id. For example, an employee who has worked only seven years cannot
receive more than seven imputed years, but could receive seven or less imputed
years. See id.
101. Id. The lawsuit was brought not only against Kentucky but also against
Kentucky's plan administrator and various other state entities. Id.
102. Id.
103. Ky. Ret., 128 S. Ct. at 2364-65
104. Id.
105. Id. Thus, Kentucky calculated Lickteig's pension based upon the normal
mode of calculation for normal retirement. See id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
that if Lickteig had been disabled prior to turning fifty-five, the Plan
would have imputed a number of additional years into his pension. 108
Thus, the EEOC argued that the Plan only failed to add those
imputed years because Lickteig became disabled after reaching the
age of fifty-five. 09
C.Procedural Posture
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Kentucky found that the EEOC could not establish age
discrimination and thus granted summary judgment to Kentucky. 0
Initially the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
affirmed the judgment of the district court."' The Sixth Circuit,
however, granted a rehearing en banc and found that the Kentucky
Retirement Plan did violate the ADEA. 112 The Sixth Circuit then
reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings." 3 Kentucky
sought certiorari and based on the potential impact of the Sixth
Circuit's decision on retirement plans and pension benefits, the
Supreme Court of the United States granted the writ. '14
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Justice Breyer's Majority Opinion Joined by Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, and Justice Thomas
Justice Breyer begins his opinion by citing Hazen Paper and
utilizing that precedent to explain and examine the case at issue." 5
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 2366.
111. Id.
112. Id. "The ADEA forbids an employer to 'fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's age."' Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2006)).
113. Ky. Ret., 128 S. Ct. at 2366.
114. Id.
115. Id. In Hazen Paper the Court held "that where, as here, a plaintiff claims
age-related 'disparate treatment' (i.e., intentional discrimination 'because of
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He notes the comparability between Kentucky Retirement and Hazen
Paper, because he believes that both cases deal with disparate
treatment issues and can be analyzed best under a disparate treatment
theory of liability.' 16 He notes that while no ADEA violation was
found to exist in Hazen Paper because the dismissal was based on
pension status and not age, the case did indicate that discrimination
based on pension status could, under the right circumstances, be
unlawful under the ADEA. 117 He notes, however, that while pension
status and age go hand-in-hand, they are still analytically distinct. 118
Thus, as was decided in Hazen Paper, dismissal based solely on
pension status would not be grounds for the finding of an ADEA
violation as analyzed under a disparate treatment theory.119 Through
his reading of Hazen Paper, Justice Breyer pulls out several "special
case[s]" where discrimination based on pension status may lead to a
violation of the ADEA, since that discrimination is simultaneously
based on age.'12  For example, Justice Breyer notes that where an
employer targets employees with a particular pension status based on
an assumption that the employees are older, an ADEA violation may
be found. 21 Similarly, he notes that Hazen Paper suggested that if
an employee is vesting his pension status as a result of his age and
not his years of service, any discrimination associated with that could
potentially violate the ADEA. 122 Justice Breyer then notes that the
case at issue, Kentucky Retirement, represents one of the
aforementioned "special case[s]."' 23
Following his examination of Hazen Paper and its potential
applicability to Kentucky Retirement, Justice Breyer enumerates six
age') the plaintiff must prove that age 'actually motivated the employer's
decision."' Id. (citing Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 610).
116. See Ky. Ret., 128 S. Ct. at 2366. He states that the disparate impact
theory is "not here at issue" because it "focuses upon unjustified discriminatory
results." Id.
117. Id. at 2366-67.
118. Ky. Ret., 128 S. Ct. at 2367.
119. Id. This is because ADEA violations will only be found if employment
discrimination is based on age, not just pension status.
120. See id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See id.
reasons he believes that, in this particular case, "differences in
treatment were not 'actually motivated' by age."124
1. Distinctiveness of Age and Pension
Justice Breyer first notes that age and pension, as a matter of
logic, are "analytically distinct." 125 Thus, it is possible that decisions
are made as a result of pension status and not age even if pension
status is based on age.' 26
2. Background Circumstances
Elaborating on his first point, Justice Breyer explains that in the
Kentucky retirement system there exist numerous background
circumstances that "eliminate the possibility that pension status,
though analytically distinct from age, nonetheless serves as a 'proxy
for age' in Kentucky's Plan."'' 27
124. Id. The word "treatment" refers to the treatment of hazardous workers
under the Kentucky Retirement Plan. Justice Breyer, writing for the Court,
believes that the Kentucky Retirement System does not violate the ADEA because
its special treatment of disabled workers, who become disabled after they were
eligible for retirement, is not motivated by age. See id.
125. Id. (citing Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 611). He believes that "one can
easily conceive of decisions that are actually made 'because of pension status and
not age, even where pension status is itself based on age." Ky. Ret., 128 S. Ct. at
2367. To further demonstrate this point, he offers an example:
[A]n employer pays all retired workers a pension, retirement
eligibility turns on age, say 65, and a 70-year-old worker retires.
Nothing in the language or in logic prevents one from concluding
that the employer has begun to pay the worker a pension, not
because the worker is over 65, but simply because the worker has
retired.
Id.
126. Id. (emphasis added). Justice Breyer notes that just because age is used to
determine pension status, it does not mean that age motivated the decisions. See id.
Because age is often a necessary tool in determining if an employee has reached
pension status, it cannot be said that simply because age is a factor, the ADEA was
violated. See id.
127. Id. Justice Breyer thus attests that, although age and pension status are
distinct, even if they were not viewed as such, in the present case, pension status
does not serve as a substitute for age in the Kentucky Retirement Plan. See id.
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One such background circumstance that Justice Breyer articulates
is that the ADEA treats pension benefits more flexibly and leniently
with respect to age. 128 He then cites to the ADEA, offering an
explanation of when and how the ADEA practices such leniency.'1 29
He further notes that the Kentucky Plan is non-discriminatory
because it promises all hazardous position employees disability
benefits, and additional disability retirement benefits should the
worker become disabled prior to his eligibility for normal retirement
benefits. 3 0
Justice Breyer further notes, as an additional background
circumstance, that Congress has previously approved programs that
calculate disability benefits using a formula that takes age into
account. 131 Furthermore, until 1984, all federal employees "received
permanent disability benefits based on a formula that, in certain
circumstances, did not just consider age, but effectively imputed
years of service only to those disabled workers younger than 60."132
Thus, because age has previously been used in the determination of
benefits under numerous retirement plans, Justice Breyer believes
that in Kentucky Retirement, pension status does not need to serve as
a proxy for age because age can be used as a basis for determining
pension status when coupled with other factors.
3. Non-Age-Related Rationale
Even though age is a consideration, Justice Breyer asserts that
because Kentucky calculates normal retirement benefits in much the
same way as it calculates disability retirement benefits, there is a
128. Id.
129. Id. Justice Breyer notes that the ADEA "'explicitly allow[s] pension
eligibility to turn on age" and that the ADEA allows an "employer to consider (age-
related) pension benefits in determining level of severance pay." Ky. Ret., 128 S.
Ct. at 2367 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(l)(1)(A)(i), 623(1)(2)(A) (2006)).
130. Ky. Ret., 128 S. Ct. at 2367-68.
131. Id. "For example, the Social Security Administration now uses such a
formula in calculating Social Security Disability Insurance benefits." Id. at 2368
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 415(b)(2)(B)(iii) (2006) and 20 C.F.R. § 404.21 1(e) (2007)).
132. Ky. Ret., 128 S. Ct. at 2368 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 8339(g) (2006)) (emphasis
added).
clear non-age-related basis for the disparity at issue. 133 The only
difference, he notes, between the two plans, normal retirement and
disabled retirement, is that in order to calculate disabled retirement
benefits, imputed years are added onto the worker's actual years of
service. 134  The disability rules and the purpose of the "imputed
years" simply treat the disabled worker as though he became disabled
after becoming eligible for retirement. 135 Thus, age only factors into
this calculation because the normal retirement rules, themselves,
133. Ky. Ret., 128 S. Ct. at 2367-68. In order to illustrate this fact, Justice
Breyer offers an example:
Suppose that Kentucky's Plan made eligible for a pension (a)
day-shift workers who have 20 years of service, and (b) night-
shift workers who have 15 years of service. Suppose further that
the Plan calculates the amount of the pension the same way in
either case, which method of calculation depends solely upon
years of service . If the Plan were then to provide workers
who become disabled prior to pension eligibility the same
pension the workers would have received had they worked until
they became pension eligible, the plan would create a disparity
between disabled day-shift and night-shift workers: A day-shift
worker who becomes disabled before becoming pension eligible
would, in many instances, end up receiving a bigger pension than
a night-shift worker who becomes disabled after becoming
pension eligible. For example, a day-shift worker who becomes
disabled prior to becoming pension-eligible would receive an
annual pension of $20,000, while a night-shift worker who
becomes disabled after becoming pension-eligible, say, after 16
years of service, would receive an annual pension of $16,000.
Id. at 2368. Justice Breyer states that the only difference, in the area of imputed
years, between this example and the situation in Kentucky Retirement "is simply an
artifact of Plan rules that treat one set of workers more generously in respect to the
timing of their eligibility for normal retirement benefits but which do not treat them
more generously in respect to the calculation of the amount of their normal
retirement benefits." Id. at 2369. Thus, the Plan simply treats disabled non-pension
eligible employees as if they had worked until the time they would have been
pension eligible. Id.
134. Id. Justice Breyer notes that there is one difference between the Plan's
calculation of normal retirement benefits and its calculation of disability retirement
benefits. See id. The Plan only imputes additional years when calculating
disability retirement benefits and only does so to bring the individual worker's
years of service to twenty or to the number of years it would take for the worker to
reach the age of fifty-five. Id. at 2369.
135. Id.
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include age as a consideration. 136 Because age is only used as a
means of treating the disabled worker as though he had worked until
the point at which he would have become eligible for normal
retirement benefits, "[t]he disparity turns upon pension eligibility and
nothing more."' 37
4. Advantage to Older Workers
Although Lickteig was disadvantaged by the Plan, Justice Breyer
states that, in another situation, an older worker could actually benefit
from the Plan. '38 He offers the following example:
Consider, for example, two disabled workers, one of
whom is aged 45 with 10 years of service, one of
whom is aged 40 with 15 years of service. Under
Kentucky's scheme, the older worker would actually
get a bigger boost of imputed years than the younger
worker (10 years would be imputed to the former,
while only 5 years would be imputed to the latter).139
Consequently, the proof that an older worker can actually benefit
from the Plan confirms that an effort to discriminate based on age
was not the underlying motive in the establishment of the Plan. 140
5. Lack of Stereotypical Assumptions
One primary reason Congress enacted the ADEA was to eradicate
the discrimination of older employees in the workplace and the
stereotypical assumptions about those older workers.141 Justice
136. Id.
137. Id. at 2369 (emphasis added).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. Justice Breyer finds that "Kentucky's system does not rely on any of
the sorts of stereotypical assumptions that the ADEA sought to eradicate." Id. W.
Willard Wirtz listed, as one of his findings, that "although age discrimination rarely
is based on the sort of animus that motivates racial, national origin, or religious
discrimination, it is based upon stereotypical assumptions of the abilities of the
Breyer asserts that Kentucky's Plan does not rely on those
stereotypical assumptions and does not make any stereotypical
distinctions about the "work capacity of 'older' workers relative to
'younger' workers."' 142 He explains that the Plan only makes two
assumptions and neither is based on, or involves, age-related
stereotypes. 143 The Plan first assumes that all disabled workers, had
they not been disabled, would have worked until they reached the
point of pension eligibility. 144  Second, the Plan assumes that no
disabled worker would have continued working after becoming
disabled and reaching pension eligibility. 145  These assumptions,
Justice Breyer attests, apply to all workers regardless of age. 146
6. Burdensome Remedy
Justice Breyer believes that a remedy for the alleged unequal
treatment of older, disabled workers under the Kentucky Plan would
be difficult to discern and even more difficult to implement. 47
Kentucky would either have to drastically cut benefits given to
disabled workers who are not pension-eligible at the time they
become disabled, or Kentucky would have to increase the benefits
given to employees who become disabled after reaching pension
aged, unsupported by objective facts." Cozza, supra note 1, at 774. Consequently,
Congress enacted the ADEA to combat these stereotypical assumptions. See id.
Justice Breyer, however, notes that the Kentucky Plan does not rely on stereotypes
and thus the ADEA was not meant to apply to plans like that of Kentucky. Ky. Ret.,
128 S. Ct. at 2369.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. Justice Breyer believes:
The difficulty of finding a remedy that can both correct the
disparity and achieve the Plan's legitimate objective-providing
each disabled worker with a sufficient retirement benefit, namely,
the normal retirement benefit that the worker would receive if he
were pension eligible at the time of disability-further suggests
that this objective and not age "actually motivated" the Plan.
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eligibility. 148 Justice Breyer highlights, however, one major flaw in
the latter remedy: Kentucky has no criteria for determining how
many imputed years to add to the years of service totals of those
employees who became disabled after reaching the age of pension
eligibility. 149 Thus, Justice Breyer asserts that there is no remedy
that would address the uneven treatment of disabled workers that
would not also jeopardize the amount that non-pension eligible
disabled workers received.150 This, he believes further demonstrates
that Kentucky's Plan is not motivated by age but rather by
necessity. 15]
Following Justice Breyer's examination of the aforementioned
factors, he explains that the majority opinion does not settle unclear
precedent since the deferential treatment presented in this case was
based upon pension status, not age. 152 He goes on to assert the rule
the Court derived from this case:
Further, the rule we adopt today for dealing with this
sort of case is clear: Where an employer adopts a
pension plan that includes age as a factor, and that
employer then treats employees differently based on
pension status, a plaintiff, to state a disparate
treatment claim under the ADEA, must adduce
sufficient evidence to show that the differential
treatment was "actually motivated" by age, not
pension status. 1 53
Justice Breyer explains that in applying this rule to future cases of
this nature, the plaintiff will have the burden of proving that he
received differential treatment based on age and to do this, he can use
the six previously mentioned factors. 154
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See id.
151. Id.
152. Id. This is because the case presented in Kentucky Retirement is a "quite
special case of differential treatment based on pension status, where pension status-
with the explicit blessing of the ADEA-itself turns, in part, on age." Id. at 2369-70.
153. Id. at 2370.
154. Id.
Finally, Justice Breyer rejects two additional arguments made by
the EEOC.' 5 5 First, he addresses an amendment that was added to
the ADEA after a Supreme Court decision in 1989.156 This
exception states that "any bona fide employee benefit plan ... which
is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the Act" would be
exempt from the ADEA prohibitions.' 57 While Justice Breyer agrees
that this amendment "narrowed the statutorily available justifications
for age-related differences," he also notes that the amendment does
not apply in this case because the Kentucky Plan was not "actually
motivated" by age. 158 Justice Breyer then goes on to disavow the
EEOC's next argument by noting that the regulation in the EEOC
Regulation and Compliance Manual which states, "'the same level of
benefits to older workers as to younger workers' does not violate the
[ADEA]," does little more than restate the statute itself.'59 The
Regulation and Compliance Manual further provides that
determining disability retirement benefits based on the number of
155. Id. The first additional argument the EEOC makes is that "it looks for
support to an amendment that Congress made to the ADEA after this Court's
decision in Public Employee Retirement System of Ohio v. Betts." Id. Second, the
EEOC "says that [the Court] must defer to contrary EEOC interpretation contained
in an EEOC regulation and compliance manual." Id.
156. Id. In Public Employees Retirement System of Ohio v. Betts an employer
denied the employee disability benefits because under its program, only workers
who became disabled before reaching the age of sixty could receive benefits and
the employee in Betts was sixty-one. Ky. Ret., 128 S. Ct. at 2370 (citing Pub.
Employees Ret. Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989)). The Court in Betts
found that the employer's decision fell within the new ADEA exception. Id.
157. Ky. Ret., 128 S. Ct. at 2370. Congress later amended the "not a
subterfuge" language with a provision that stated that "age-based disparities in the
provision of benefits are lawful only when they are justified in respect to cost
savings." Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(B)(i) (2006)).
158. Ky. Ret., 128 S. Ct. at 2370.
159. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10(a)(2) (2007)). The Compliance Manual
further states: "'[b]asing disability retirement benefits on the number of years a
disabled employee would have worked until normal retirement age by definition
gives more constructive years of service to younger than to older employees' and
thus violates the Act." Ky. Ret., 128 S. Ct. at 2371 (quoting 2 EEOC Compliance
Manual § 3, p. 627:0010 (2001)). Justice Breyer believes that while such
Compliance Manuals are entitled to respect, the Court is entitled to its
interpretation of the ADEA. Ky. Ret., 128 S. Ct. at 2371; see also Nat'l R.R.
Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 111(2002) (finding that compliance
manuals are entitled to the Court's respect).
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years an employee would have worked does violate the ADEA,
because it gives more imputed years to the younger employees. 160 In
contrast, Justice Breyer cites Hazen Paper and advocates for the
disparate treatment theory, by noting that the Act requires a showing
of discriminatory intent in order for a violation to be found. 16'
B. Justice Kennedy's Dissenting Opinion Joined by Justice Scalia,
Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Alito
1. Majority Unsettles the Issue
Prior to explaining his contention with the majority, Justice
Kennedy reprimands the majority for "ignor[ing] established rules for
interpreting and enforcing one of the most important statutes
Congress has enacted to protect the Nation's work force from age
discrimination, the [ADEA]."' 162  He scolds the majority for not
correctly reading the statute and notes that the most straightforward
reading of the statute is the correct one.' 63  Stemming from the
majority's alleged misreading of the statute, Justice Kennedy notes
that the majority's decision undercuts not only the true meaning of
the statute, but also "creates unevenness in administration,
unpredictability in litigation, and uncertainty as to employee rights
once thought well settled."' 164  Justice Kennedy lists a number of
cases decided in a number of different circuit courts, which boast
160. Ky. Ret., 128 S. Ct. at 2371 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10(a)(2) (2007)).
161. Ky. Ret., 128 S. Ct. at 2371. Justice Breyer believes the Compliance
Manual is contrary to the Court's interpretation of the ADEA. Id. Furthermore, he
states that the Manual makes little effort to justify its ADEA interpretation and thus
lacks "the necessary 'power to persuade' us." Id. (citing Skidmore v. Swift Co.,
323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
162. Ky. Ret., 128 S. Ct. at 2371 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The Court today
ignores established rules for interpreting and enforcing one of the most important
statutes Congress has enacted to protect the Nation's work force from age
discrimination, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967....").
163. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy states that had the majority
correctly read the statute, they would have reached the following conclusion:
"When an employer makes age a factor in an employee benefit plan in a formal,
facial, deliberate, and explicit manner, to the detriment of older employees, this is a
violation of the Act." Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 2372 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
holdings different from the one decided by the majority. 165 This
clash among the circuits and the Supreme Court, Justice Kennedy
believes, is unacceptable.
2. Majority Misinterprets Precedent to Reach Wrong Conclusion
Justice Kennedy condemns the majority for failing to recognize
and address the discriminatory nature of Kentucky's Plan.1 66  He
points out that those employees who become disabled prior to
reaching the age of retirement eligibility are treated in a vastly
different manner than those employees who become disabled after
reaching the age of retirement.1 67  Whether Kentucky intended to
discriminate or not, the result of the Plan is a system that
"compensates otherwise similarly situated individuals differently
based on age." 168
Justice Kennedy then looks to the holding in Hazen Paper, and
asserts that the Court in Hazen Paper made it clear that "no
additional proof of motive is required in an ADEA case once the
employment policy at issue is deemed discriminatory on its face."' 169
Justice Kennedy interprets Hazen Paper to mean that any facially
discriminatory policy requiring adverse treatment of older employees
(or any employees with the protected trait) is "actually motivated" by
165. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see EEOC v. Jefferson Cty. Sheriffs Dept.,
467 F.3d 571, 573 (6th Cir. 2006) (overturning Lyon v. Ohio Ed. Ass'n & Prof.
Staff Union, 53 F.3d 135 (6th Cir. 1995)); see also, e.g. Jankovitz v. Des Moines
Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 421 F.3d 649, 653-55 (8th Cir. 2005); Abrahamson v. Bd.
of Ed. of Wappingers Falls Cent. Sch. Dist., 374 F.3d 66, 72-73 (2d Cir. 2004);
Arnett v. Cal. Pub. Employees Ret. Sys., 179 F.3d 690, 695-97 (9th Cir. 1999);
Auerbach v. Bd. of Ed. of Harborfields Cent. Sch. Dist., 136 F.3d 104, 109-14 (2d
Cir. 1998); Huff v. UARCO, Inc., 122 F.3d 374, 387-88 (7th Cir. 1997).
166 Ky. Ret., 128 S. Ct. at 2371 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 2372-73 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy illustrates that
"[i]f the employee can no longer work as a result of a disability . he or she is
entitled to receive disability retirement. Employees who are eligible for normal
retirement benefits are ineligible for disability retirement." Id. at 2372 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting). This means that employees that are in the "normal retirement
system" are only compensated based on their actual years of service. Id. (Kennedy,
J., dissenting). However, employees in the "disability retirement system" get a
bonus of imputed years. Id. at 2372-73 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 2373 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
169. Ky. Ret., 128 S. Ct. at 2374 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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age. 170 He reiterates that the rule the Court should adhere to, as
stated in Hazen Paper, "is that once the plaintiff establishes that a
policy discriminates on its face, no additional proof of a less-than-
benign motive for the challenged employment action is required." T17'
Justice Kennedy cites two additional Supreme Court cases in support
of the aforementioned Hazen Paper rule, Trans World Airlines, Inc.
v. Thurston and Los Angeles Department of Water & Power v.
Manhart.1 72  In both cases, the Court held that proof of a
discriminatory motive or "effect" is not necessary so long as the
policy or practice is "discriminatory on its face."' 173  By failing to
recognize the rule established in Hazen Paper, Thurston, and
Manhart, the Court in Kentucky Retirement reaches a conclusion that
violates the ADEA.
In addition to Justice Kennedy's belief that the majority
misinterprets the rule of Hazen Paper, he also believes the majority
has overstated what Hazen Paper meant when it noted that "pension
status and age are 'analytically distinct."' 174  He states that the
majority's interpretation of this language from Hazen Paper creates
170. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy notes if the holding in
Hazen Paper is read without qualification, the majority's interpretation might have
been correct (that is, "that an employment practice discriminated only if it is
'actually motivated' by the protected trait."). Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting
Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 610). However, if the relevant passage is read in full,
"Hazen Paper makes quite clear that no additional proof of motive is required in an
ADEA case once the employment policy at issue is deemed discriminatory on its
face." Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 2374-75 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 2375 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
173. Ky. Ret., 128 S. Ct. at 2375 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). In Thurston, the
Court found that the policy discriminated against older workers because while the
policy did allow pilots over the age of sixty to continue working, it required that
they be transferred to the position of flight engineer and they would have to bid for
that position. Id. at 2375 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1985)). Under the bid procedure, a pilot who had
to switch positions because of a disability had priority over one that had to switch
based on age. Ky. Ret., 128 S. Ct. at 2375 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing
Thurston, 469 U.S. at 111). In Manhart, the retirement plan forced female
employees to make larger contributions to their retirement than male employees.
Ky. Ret., 128 S. Ct. at 2375 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing L.A. Dep't of Water &
Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978)).
174. Ky. Ret., 128 S. Ct. at 2375 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Hazen Paper,
507 U.S. at 611).
"a virtual safe harbor for policies that discriminate on the basis of
pension status, even when pension status is tied directly to age . . .
,175 Justice Kennedy, however, emphasizes that the facts of Hazen
Paper are distinct from those present in Kentucky Retirement.176 In
Hazen Paper, pension status and age were "analytically distinct"
because the employee's pension eligibility had nothing to do with
age-it was tied solely to years of service. 177  In Kentucky
Retirement, however, an employee's pension eligibility is not only
tied with years of service but with age as well. Based on these
differences, Justice Kennedy notes that "[Kentucky Retirement] is the
opposite of Hazen Paper."178
3. Flawed Reasoning of the Majority
Justice Kennedy believes that the majority's holding in Kentucky
Retirement will open the door for companies to enact policies using
pension eligibility as a factor in determining other benefits (e.g.
175. Ky. Ret., 128 S. Ct. at 2375 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). He believes that
the Court in Hazen Paper did not support or allow this creation of a safe harbor
when pensions status and age are tied together. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
176. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
177. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
178. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). He notes that in Kentucky Retirement the
age discrimination is active and age is actively used as a factor in Kentucky's Plan.
Id. at 2376 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). He believes that because the discrimination is
active in the Plan, Kentucky Retirement is distinguishable from Hazen Paper. Ky.
Ret., 128 S. Ct. at 2375 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). He further explains that because
age is used as a determining factor of pension eligibility and pension status is used
to determine eligibility for disability benefits, pension status and age merge into
one category. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Based on this merger, Justice Kennedy
concludes that Kentucky facially discriminates on the basis of age. Id. at 2376
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). Similarly, Justice Kennedy disagrees with the majority's
attempt to reconcile its holding under the ADEA's exemption allowing employers
to condition pension eligibility on age. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). He believes
that the exemption provides the majority no support because its coverage is limited
to: "[E]mployee pension benefit plan[s] [that] provid[e] for the attainment of a
minimum age as a condition of eligibility for normal or early retirement benefits."
Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 623(l)(l)(A)(i) (Supp. 2007)).
Justice Kennedy believes that if Kentucky's Plan is allowed to "fit through" this
exemption, any number of benefits will be allowed under the ADEA so long as
they are tied to an "age-based pension status designation." Id. (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
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health care benefits, job assignments, reimbursements, promotions,
parking privileges). 7 9 He believes in this possibility based upon the
reasoning the majority uses to explain and "limit" its holding.' 80
Justice Kennedy refers to the majority's reasoning that, in Kentucky
Retirement, age is not the sole determining factor of pension
eligibility but is one factor "embedded in a set of 'complex system-
wide rules."' 1 81  Thus, the majority held that "there is no
discrimination on the basis of a protected trait if the trait is one
among several factors that bear upon how an employee is treated."' 82
Justice Kennedy strongly opposes this reasoning noting that there are
no cases or statutes indicating that discrimination based on age, or
any other protected trait, is allowed so long as the protected trait "is
one among many variables."' 
83
179. Ky. Ret., 128 S. Ct. at 2376 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy
writes: "If the ADEA allows an employer to tie disability benefits to an age-based
pension status designation, that same designation can be used to determine wages,
hours, health care benefits, reimbursements, job assignments, promotions, office
space, transportation vouchers, parking privileges, and any other conceivable
benefit or condition of employment." Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
180. See id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
181. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 2377 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
183. See Ky. Ret., 128 S. Ct. at 2376 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice
Kennedy argues that "[a]ge is a determining factor of pension eligibility for all
workers over the age of 55 who have over 5 (but less than 20) years of service; and
pension status, in turn, is used to determine eligibility for disability benefits." Id. at
2375-76 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Thus, pension eligibility or status and age
"merge into one category." Id. at 2376 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy
believes the Court recognizes this problem and based on that recognition, attempts
to limit its holding. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy, however,
believes the Court limits its holding "in ways not permitted by statute or our
previous employment discrimination cases." Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The
Court limits its holding by noting that age is not the only determining factor of
pension eligibility and since there are other factors, pension status and age are not
merged but are analytically distinct. See id. at 2376 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Justice Kennedy strongly disagrees with this reasoning, asserting that there is
nothing "in our prior ADEA cases ... and certainly [nothing] in our related Title
VII jurisprudence, that discrimination based on a protected trait is permissible if the
protected trait is one among many variables." Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). For
example, in Los Angeles Department of Water & Power v. Manhart, "sex was not
the only factor determining how much an employee was required to contribute to
the pension plan on a monthly basis; the employee's salary, age, and length of
service were also variables in the equation." Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing
Justice Kennedy similarly dissents with several of the factors
established by the majority opinion. 8 4  The factors he most
vehemently disagrees with are those pertaining to "background
circumstances. ' 185  He asserts that "[t]here is a difference
between a laudable purpose and a rule of law," a difference that
renders the consideration of background circumstances nearly
useless.1 86 For example, a discriminatory employment policy cannot
be deemed lawful just because the employer's motives were
benign.187 Knowledge of why an employer enacted a certain policy
is impertinent since all that matters is the rule of law and how that
rule applies to the policy at hand.
In expressing his understanding of the reason behind the
majority's ruling, Justice Kennedy states: "The Court's desire to
avoid construing the ADEA in a way that encourages the
Commonwealth to eliminate its early retirement program or to reduce
benefits to the policemen and firefighters who are covered under the
disability plan is understandable." '1 88 The fact that Kentucky's Plan
might be good public policy, however, does not justify the majority's
L.A. Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 705). However, despite
the fact that other factors went into determining whether an employee had to
contribute to the pension plan, the Court still found that the plan was facially
discriminatory. Ky. Ret., 128 S. Ct. at 2376-77 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing
Manhart, 435 U.S. at 711).
184. See Ky. Ret., 128 S. Ct. at 2377 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
185. See id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
186. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
187. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 2378 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). While Justice Kennedy understands
the majority's reluctance to force Kentucky to alter its retirement policies, he offers
examples of just how easy it would be for Kentucky to change their policies in
order to eliminate the discrimination of older workers. See id. (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting). Justice Kennedy believes that "Kentucky could avoid any problems by
not imputing un-worked years of service to any disabled workers, old and young
alike." Ky. Ret., 128 S. Ct. at 2378 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Under this scenario,
younger workers would still receive disability benefits; they would just not reap the
benefits of imputed years. Similarly, this change would place older workers that
worked past the age of pension eligibility on equal footing with younger workers.
Another option would be to force older workers to retire immediately upon
reaching the age of pension eligibility. See id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). With the
absence of employees that have worked past the age of pension eligibility,
Kentucky could continue to impute years of service to its disabled workers without
violating the ADEA.
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decision to ignore precedent, ignore the plain text of the Act, and
misconstrue the meaning of the ADEA. 189
V. IMPACT
A. Impact on Employees
The Court's decision in Kentucky Retirement to uphold
Kentucky's Retirement Plan and consequently validate the use of the
disparate treatment theory of liability even when an employment
policy is facially discriminatory, impacts both employers and
employees in distinct ways. The holding places an immensely heavy
burden on employees trying to allege discrimination for they are now
the ones who must prove that the employer's decision to enact the
policy was "actually motivated" by age.' 90 Aside from this extensive
burden, the holding in Kentucky Retirement has the effect of stripping
employees of several other employment privileges and rights. Under
Kentucky's Plan, two employees who have served a given employer
for the same amount of time but are different ages may receive vastly
different benefits.' 91
1. Affected Employees
As demonstrated by Justice Kennedy, in his dissenting opinion,
the holding in Kentucky Retirement is not limited to disability
benefits, hazardous workers, or any of the other specific
characteristics of the case.' 92 Justice Kennedy notes that according
to the decision of the Court, "[i]f the ADEA allows an employer to
tie disability benefits to an age-based pension status designation, that
same designation can be used to determine wages, hours, health care
189. See id. at 2379 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
190. See id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
191. Mark Walsh, Justices Examine Age Disparity in Retirement Systems,
EDUCATION WEEK 16, 16 (2008). As noted by Justice Breyer in the majority
opinion, there are some instances in which an older employee will actually benefit
more from the current Plan than a younger employee. See supra note 139.
However, while some older employees will and currently do benefit from the Plan,
many other employees are severely disadvantaged by it.
192. Ky. Ret., 128 S. Ct. at 2376 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
benefits, reimbursements, job assignments, promotions, office space,
transportation vouchers, parking privileges, and any other
conceivable benefit or condition of employment."' 93  While the
Court's ruling was issued in the context of pension eligibility being
used as a factor for the determination of disability benefits for
hazardous workers, the holding really gives employers, in any
profession, the freedom to use pension eligibility as a factor to
determine any number of benefits. Since most working Americans
will eventually reach an age at which they are eligible to collect
retirement benefits, the ruling in Kentucky Retirement could
potentially adversely impact the entire American workforce. Thus,
upon reaching the age of pension eligibility, many employees will
face the possibility of that eligibility being used against them as a
factor in determining their benefits.
2. Early Retirement Incentive
The inducement of early retirement, at first glance, doesn't seem
the least bit harmful to the United States workforce. However, when
that incentive involves the threat of fewer potential benefits, should
the employee choose to work past the age of retirement eligibility,
the incentive not only violates the ADEA, but also proves to be
extremely detrimental to employees nationwide. Furthermore,
because of the current economic state of our nation as well as the
multitudes of workers soon to be reaching "the age of retirement," 1
94
193. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
194. See generally Darrell R. VanDeusen & Meg Gallucci, Baby Boomers
Retire-Impact on the Law, MD. B.J. 18, 18-20 (2009). In December 2008, the
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) announced that the United States
was in the midst of a recession. Tom Abate, It's Official: U.S. in Recession All of
2008, S.F. CHRONICLE, Dec. 02, 2008, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2008/12/02/MNTL 14FCBU.DTL. The NBER further
declared that the "economy has been in retreat since last December sent Wall Street
into a bearish fit that knocked nearly 9 percent off the S&P 500 index." Id.
Additionally, "[m]any economists believe that current downturn could be the worst
since the recession of 1980-1982, when the U.S. unemployment rate soared above
10 percent." Id. The current economic state of the nation has caused countless
companies to scale back. See id. Currently, the jobless rate for the nation is 6.5
percent. Id.; see also CNN Money, Mounting Job Losses,
http://money.cnn.com/news/specials/jobcuts/2009/ (last visited April 6, 2009); see
also Reuters, Calif. Jobless Hits Double Digits, CNN MONEY, Feb. 27, 2009,
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it is increasingly important for the Court to mandate that employers
protect their older employees and prevent them from creating facially
discriminatory policies that deprive workers of their rights and
earned privileges.
In our current economic climate when faced with huge losses in
assets and investments, more and more Americans are opting to defer
retirement." A recently conducted survey shows that fifty-seven
percent of Americans over the age of forty-five who lost money in
investments over the past year are expected to delay retirement. 196 In
addition, one in four of those Americans have already postponed
plans to retire. 197 With this modem increase in delayed retirement,
the holding in Kentucky Retirement becomes vitally important as it
has the potential to allow employers to discriminate on the basis on
"pension eligibility" when determining what benefits those older
working Americans will receive. Thus, if workers should choose to
postpone retirement until their assets or investments once again
increase in value, they will run the risk of receiving decreased
benefits from employers. This potential decrease in benefits severely
disadvantages older workers who, because of economic conditions
out of their control, have to remain in the workforce past the point at
http://money.cnn.com/2009/O2/27/news/economy/califomia econ.reut/index.htm?p
ostversion=2009022716.
195. Andrea Hopkins, Older Americans Postpone Retirement as Economy
Sags, REUTERS, Jan. 17, 2009,
http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSTRE50G 1PD20090117. Many older
American depended on their investments to fund their retirement. Id. However,
"[t]he U.S. recession has compounded the problem, with home values too low to
provide the nest egg many seniors need and interest rates on safer assets close to
zero." Id. For example, as of December 2, 2008, assets in retirement accounts
have lost 32 percent of their value as compared with their value in September 2007.
Id. Thus, a large population of older working Americans have chosen to work
longer in order to replenish their retirement funds. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. "Richard Johnson, an expert in seniors and retirement at the Urban
Institute" notes, "[t]he average age people leave the workforce is still about 64 ...
[b]ut the share of older people in the workforce has been going up since 1998." Id.
Thus, as more and more older working Americans delay retirement, the "share of
older people in the workforce" increases. See id. Additionally, as of August 2008,
"36 percent of men and 26 percent of women aged 65 to 69 were still working,
compared with just 26 percent of men and 17 percent of women 10 years earlier."
Id.
which they are eligible to collect their pensions. Similarly, based
upon the sheer amount of older employees delaying retirement, the
Court's decision in Kentucky Retirement will affect an extremely
large population. 198
In addition to the need to postpone retirement because of
America's weakened economy, other pension eligible workers simply
want to keep working to remain connected to the "world of work." '199
The reasons for employees' continued desire to remain a part of the
workforce vary: "To build and maintain financial security; to stay
productive; or to remain socially engaged., 20  Regardless of the
reason, older workers should be entitled to work to whatever age they
please without fear of losing benefits or facing discrimination. The
ADEA was enacted to protect older employees and their right to
work to an age of their choosing.201 Thus, based upon the guarantees
present in the ADEA, employers need to ensure that they provide for
older workers in the same way they provide for younger workers.
The holding in Kentucky Retirement, however, threatens the
guarantees of the ADEA. According to Kentucky Retirement,
employers are allowed to treat older and younger employees
differently on the basis of pension status.20 2 The Court's ruling not
only makes the text of the ADEA moot, but also disadvantages all
those employees wishing-for whatever reason-to remain a part of
the workforce after becoming eligible for retirement.
While many older employees are delaying retirement, there are
also many who, regardless of the current economic climate, still wish
to retire upon reaching the age of retirement eligibility. Currently,
"America is about to confront the largest shift in the overall age of its
198. See id.
199. VanDeusen & Gallucci, supra note 194, at 19.
200. Id.
201. Congress intended for the ADEA "to promote employment opportunities
for older workers" by requiring employers to make decisions based not upon the
age of workers, but upon their capabilities and job performance. Gregory, supra
note 19, at 19. Thus, by requiring employers to make decisions based upon factors
other than age, the ADEA essentially gives older workers the freedom to continue
working until retirement or until they no longer have the ability to perform their
duties to the standard required by their employer.
202. See Ky. Ret., 128 S. Ct at 2366-67. This is conditioned on the fact that
pension status and age are "analytically distinct" and that factors other than age go
into determining pension status. Id.
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workplace that our country has ever seen. Seventy-six million
American children were born between 1946 and 1964. ", 203 With so
many individuals born during that nearly twenty year period, and as
members of that "boomer generation" near retirement eligibility,
many analysts predict intense labor shortages. 20 4  "While an
estimated 19 million jobs will be created over the next six years,
about 36 million boomers will leave the workforce at the same
time. 20 5  With American companies facing such an immense
employee shortage, it is vitally important to keep these "boomers"
interested in working long enough so that when they do retire, others
will be ready and able to replace them. The Court's holding in
Kentucky Retirement, however, threatens this situation. Kentucky
Retirement made it possible for employers to use pension status as a
factor in determining benefits and policies. 2 6 As such, why would
members of this boomer generation even consider working past the
age at which they are pension eligible when doing so would put them
at risk for discriminatory treatment? Thus, the Court's ruling in
Kentucky Retirement not only guides the decisions of older workers
considering postponing retirement, but additionally threatens the
workplace by encouraging the generation that is currently the most
dominant in the workplace to retire immediately upon reaching the
age of retirement eligibility.
203. VanDeusen & Gallucci, supra note 194, at 19.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. See Ky. Ret., 128 S. Ct at 2372-73 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The
majority makes it possible for employers to use pension eligibility as a factor for
determining benefits by undercutting the basic framework of the ADEA and
precedent. Id. at 2371 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy believes that
"the Court today ignores established rules for interpreting and enforcing one of the
most important statutes Congress has enacted to protect the Nation's work force
from age discrimination, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act." Id.
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). Previously, the ADEA was interpreted very literally and
"the most straightforward reading of the statute [was] the correct one: When an
employer makes age a factor in an employee benefit plan in a formal, facial,
deliberate, and explicit manner, to the detriment of older employees, this is a
violation of the Act." Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). However, in interpreting the
Act "as requiring a showing that the discrimination at issue 'actually motivated' the
employer's decision," the majority allows pension eligibility to be used as a factor
so long as age discrimination didn't actually motivate the employers decision. See
id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
3. Violation of ADEA Guaranteed Rights
The majority's ruling in Kentucky Retirement not only adversely
affects the benefits of pension eligible employees, but also severely
contravenes with the true meaning of the ADEA. In support of his
opinion, Justice Breyer comments: "What you are looking at is to see
whether the purpose of Congress is somehow implicated, a purpose
designed to prevent stereotypical thinking from being used to put
older people at a disadvantage ... [a]nd there is no indication that
this is so in this case." '207 While Congress did enact section 623 of
the ADEA to eradicate stereotypical assumption of older employees
in the workplace, is this what the text of the ADEA says? 20 8 The
actual text of the ADEA states that it is unlawful for an employer to
"discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's age., 20 9  Nowhere in the text of the
ADEA, however, does it state that the discrimination must be based
on "stereotypical thinking. '"210 In his dissent, Justice Kennedy
advocates for a straightforward reading of the statute, noting that
such a reading is the correct one. 211 The text of the ADEA explicitly
guarantees that older employees will be free from discrimination
based on age in the workplace and a straightforward reading of this
text would indicate that any discrimination, whether or not actually
motivate by age, would violate the ADEA and employee rights under
207. Walsh, supra note 191, at 16.
208. While Congress's intent in enacting section 623 of the ADEA was to
eradicate stereotypical thinking in the workplace, the text of the ADEA mentions
nothing about worker stereotypes or the need for their eradication. See 29 U.S.C. §
623(a)(1) (2006). Rather, the text states: "It shall be unlawful for an employer to
fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's age. " Id.
209. Id.
210. See id.
211. Ky. Ret., 128 S. Ct. at 2371 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("[T]he most
straightforward reading of the statute is the correct one: When an employer makes
age a factor in an employee benefit plan in a formal, facial, deliberate, and explicit
manner, to the detriment of older employees, this is a violation of the [ADEA].").
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the ADEA.2 12 Based upon this forthright reading of the text of the
ADEA, it is obvious that the Kentucky's Plan violates the ADEA
because, regardless of the motives or intentions behind the Plan, it
does discriminate based on age. As Justice Kennedy affirms,
"Kentucky's disability retirement plan violates the ADEA, an Act
intended to promote the interests of older Americans." 21 3  In
violating the ADEA, the Plan trounces on the rights guaranteed to
employees by the ADEA.
B. Impact on Employers
While the Court's decision in Kentucky Retirement negatively
impacts employees-depriving them of their ADEA guaranteed
rights as well as limiting potential benefits they may receive after
becoming eligible for retirement-the Court's ruling represents a
victory for employers. As Justice Kennedy notes, the Court's ruling
appears to suggest that age can be used as a factor so long as it "is
not the sole determining factor of pension eligibility but is instead
just one factor embedded in a set of 'complex system-wide rules."'' 2 14
Under the Plan, an employee's age and years of service are utilized to
determine pension eligibility. 215  Thus, following the Court's
holding, employers can theoretically use age as a factor to determine
benefits, so long as it isn't the only factor.216
212. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2006).
213. Ky. Ret., 128 S. Ct at 2378 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy
believes the Court's ruling violates the ADEA because it does make age a factor,
despite it being disguised as pension eligibility or status, which is to the detriment
of older workers. See id. at 2371 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). By using pension
eligibility, which is based upon the employees age, as a factor in determining
retirement disability benefits, Kentucky discriminates on the basis of age thus,
older workers are negatively affected. See id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice
Kennedy further notes: "Kentucky could avoid any problems by not imputing un-
worked years of service to any disabled workers, old and young alike." Id. at 2378
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). This change would cause employers to treat older and
younger workers the same. Justice Kennedy does note that this would result in the
benefits of younger workers being cut, however, this would clearly be outweighed
by the benefit of adhering to the ADEA. See id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
214. Id. at 2376 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
215. Id. at 2365.
216. See id. at 2376.
1. Overwhelming Support
In support of the Plan, four amicus curiae briefs were filed.
Those amici include thirteen states and several government
associations (e.g. the National League of Cities and the National
School Boards Association).2 17 Conversely, only one amicus brief
was filed in support of the EEOC, and the brief was filed by the
American Association of Retired Persons and the National
Employment Lawyers Association.2 18 Aside from rearguing the case
on its merits, those amici curiae in support of the petitioner,
Kentucky Retirement Systems, urged the Court to uphold the Plan
based on the financial burden and expense that ruling against it
would have on companies and businesses.2 19 The amici curiae
contended that if the Plan were not to be upheld, many other states or
companies with similar plans would have to expend great amounts of
money and time to change their plans in accordance with the Court's
ruling.22 ° The sheer number of states and organizations in support of
Kentucky Retirement Systems and the Plan demonstrates the
significant beneficial impact the Court's hold will have on
employers.
2. Fiscal Responsibilities and Benefits
Pension plans distribute more than 140 billion dollars annually in
benefits and "these payments ... provide a robust economic stimulus
to local economies throughout the nation." 221  Similarly, "studies
217. Law Memo: First in Employment Law, Kentucky Retirement Systems v.
EEOC, http://www.lawmemo.com/supreme/case/Kentucky/ (last visited Feb. 8,
2009).
218. Id.
219. Brief for the National Ass'n of State Retirement Administrators, et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 8-9, Kentucky Ret. Sys. v. EEOC, 128 S.
Ct. 2361 (2008) (No. 06-1037).
220. Brief for the States of Michigan et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 10, Kentucky Ret. Sys. v. EEOC, 128 S. Ct. 2361 (2008) (No. 06-
1037).
221. Brief for the National Ass'n of State Retirement Administrators, et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 7, Kentucky Ret. Sys. v. EEOC, 128 S. Ct.
2361 (2008) (No. 06-1037).
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indicate that public pension funds and the benefits they distribute
make important contributions to the local, state, and national
economies." '222 In support of the Kentucky Retirement Plan, the
amici curiae argued that invalidating the Plan would:
(1) upset the actuarial assumptions on which the states
make funding decisions; (2) lead to huge expenses in
designing, managing, and protecting these plans; (3)
require fundamental constitutional and statutory
changes in virtually every state in the U.S.; and (4)
foster uncertainty in the national financial, markets as
the plans attempt to discern the status of the law and
come into compliance with it. 22 3
Thus, the main reason the Plan drew so much amici curiae
support is simply fiscal. Consequently, the holding in Kentucky
Retirement allows companies and businesses to leave intact their
retirement plans, even if age is used as a factor, as long as there are
other factors taken into consideration as well, in determining benefits
(e.g. disability benefits) and pension status. The amici curiae further
noted that had the Court's holding in Kentucky Retirement not upheld
the Plan, retirement plans across the nation would have been forced
"to review and re-design their retirement plans." 224 The holding in
Kentucky Retirement saves employers from having to undergo this
strain. Rather than spend the time or money re-devising their
retirement plans, employers are free to leave them as is-with age as
a determining factor in pension benefits.
In addition to saving employers time and money, the holding in
Kentucky Retirement offers them relief during this current time of
economic strain and crisis.225 In December 2007, the United States
222. Id.
223. Id. at 8-9.
224. Id. at 11.
225. See Lucia Mutikani, U.S. Business Climate Worst in 27 Years, S.F.
SENTINEL, Jan. 26, 2009, http://www.sanfranciscosentinel.com/?p=19054 /.
Currently, U.S. businesses "are experiencing the worst business conditions in 27
years." Id. Similarly, a recent poll found that the economic slump worsened in the
fourth quarter. Id. Because businesses are now seeing declines in profits, it will
undoubtedly be a relief to such businesses that they are free to use pension
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economy tipped into recession. 226  The National Association of
Business Economics (NABE) conducted a survey, which revealed
that that United Sates is facing its worst economic conditions since
1982.227 For example, "[a]bout 47 percent of respondents in the
NABE survey reported a fall in demand for services and goods,
which was an all-time high, while only 20 percent saw an increase.
This was the lowest percentage since the survey started in 1982. "228
In these times of economic turmoil when businesses are struggling to
stay afloat, the holding in Kentucky Retirement relieves employers of
the responsibility of having to revamp their retirement policies-an
act that would undoubtedly cost employers and businesses thousands
of very scarce and valuable dollars. The amici curiae in support of
Kentucky Retirement Systems pointed out that had the Court in
Kentucky Retirement invalidated the Plan, such a decision "could cost
millions of dollars nationwide and could further weaken the
economic viability of retirement funds that may already be
underfunded. ' ' 229 Thus, in ruling in favor of the Plan, the Court in
Kentucky Retirement saved employers countless capital, capital they
likely depend on to fund and support other areas of their businesses.
eligibility as a factor in determining employee benefits. This newly Court-
validated ability will enable employers to give pension eligible employees fewer
benefits based on the fact that they worked past the time at which they were
eligible to retire. Because employers would be able to give pension eligible
employees fewer monetary (and non-monetary) benefits, employers would in turn
save their companies funds. Furthermore, employers with retirement disability
policies like that in Kentucky Retirement will not be forced to spend the time or
money reworking their retirement policies to eliminate pension eligibility as a
factor-pension eligibility can now be freely used.
226. Id. While the recession began in December 2007, it was not announced
until December 2008. Abate, supra note 194. Furthermore, many economists
believe that the current downturn is the worst it has been since the recession of
1980-1982. Id. Many economists attest that this current economic crisis is a direct
result of the "housing market collapse and the resulting global credit crisis [which]
have eroded household wealth, causing sharp cut backs in spending and severely
depressing demand." Mutikani, supra note 225.
227. Mutikani, supra note 225.
228. Id.
229. Brief for the States of Michigan et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 12, Ky. Ret. Sys. v. EEOC, 128 S. Ct. 2361 (2008) (No. 06-1037).
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3. Formulation of Future Retirement Plans
The amici curiae in support of Kentucky Retirement Systems
urged that invalidating the Plan "could have substantially adverse
implications for the retirement system of many States that have
retirement statutes., 230 The National Association of State Retirement
Administrators (NASRA), one association that filed a brief as amicus
curiae in support of Kentucky Retirement Systems, noted that
twenty-five million people currently rely on existing retirement
plans. 23' They further argued that a change in retirement eligibility
and/or benefit amounts would result in exorbitantly large payments
that could endanger the retirement industry. 232 Thus, NASRA feared
that if retirement policies had to be altered in order to provide more
money or benefits to certain individuals, with so many people
covered by those retirement policies, the retirement industry would
no longer be able to afford to provide the benefits promised to policy-
holders. Similarly, with the amount of money the retirement industry
would have to reallocate, retirement policies would have to be
completely restructured in order to accommodate those individuals
that, according to a potential ruling in favor of the EEOC, were being
discriminated against in the retirement policies. However, because
the Court ruled in favor of Kentucky Retirement Systems, states and
companies no longer have to worry about restructuring their
retirement policies. The amici curiae in support of Kentucky
Retirement Systems will be able to keep their existing plans and
policies in tact, as well as construct new future policies using age as a
factor, so long as other factors are used as well.
230. Id. at 10.
231. Brief of the National Ass'n of State Retirement Administrators, et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 4, Ky. Ret. Sys. v. EEOC, 128 S. Ct. 2361
(2008) (No. 06-1037).
232. Id. NASRA believe that a ruling in favor of EEOC, the respondent,
would in this case force companies and states to reorganize retirement policies. See
id. Similarly, a ruling for EEOC would require employers to increase benefits to
some while leaving the benefits of others as they currently stand. See id. Because
of the number of high number of policies currently in existence in the United
States, the NASRA claims that this reorganization would cause irreparable damage
the retirement industry. See id.
Additionally, the thirteen states 233 that jointly filed a brief as
amicus curiae in support of Kentucky Retirement Systems feared that
if the Court had ruled in favor of the EEOC and invalidated the Plan,
the other states would be similarly forced to change their statutory
and constitutional frameworks to comply with the Court's
interpretation of the ADEA.234 The ruling in Kentucky Retirement,
however, allows those amici curiae states to maintain their current
statutory and constitutional frameworks as well as alter those
frameworks in the future to include age as a factor for determining
benefits or policy eligibility, so long as age is not the sole factor.
Consequently, the holding in Kentucky Retirement will save
employers in countless states the time and effort of reworking their
retirement plans. Additionally, in those states that do not have
retirement policies similar to the one in Kentucky, should they wish
to alter their retirement policies in the future, they will be free to do
so using age as a factor in determining pension eligibility.
C. Impact on the United States Judicial System
As Justice Kennedy notes, "[t]he Court today undercuts [the]
basic framework" for analyzing claims of ADEA violations. 235 After
the Court's ruling in Smith, disparate impact once again became an
available option for ADEA claims. Following the Court's decision in
Kentucky Retirement, however, disparate impact appears to once
again be displaced. In his dissent, Justice Kennedy writes,
"[d]isparate treatment on the basis of age is prohibited unless some
exemption or defense provided in the Act applies." 236  Thus,
233. The thirteen states include: Michigan, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado,
Delaware, Idaho, Maryland, Minnesota, New Mexico, Oklahoma, South Carolina,
Tennessee, and Texas. Brief for the States of Michigan et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners at 10, Kentucky Ret. Sys. v. EEOC, 128 S. Ct. 2361 (2008)
(No. 06-1037).
234. Brief for the States of Michigan et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 10, Ky. Ret. Sys. v. EEOC, 128 S. Ct. 2361 (2008) (No. 06-1037).
The aforementioned mentioned states largely have this fear because if the Court
had ruled in favor of the EEOC and struck down Kentucky's retirement system as a
violation of the ADEA, those states would no longer be able to use age as a factor
in providing retirement. Id.
235. Ky. Ret., 128 S. Ct. at 2371 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
236. Id. at 2371.
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employers should not be entitled to treat employees differently on the
basis of age, unless the ADEA allows it.
In Kentucky Retirement, the policy in question does treat older
employees differently than younger employees. 237 In upholding that
policy, the Court's ruling overlooks precedent and the plain text of
the ADEA to find that a facially discriminatory policy is not enough
to prove an ADEA violation. Rather, some discriminatory motive or
intent must be identified. However, "[b]y embracing the approach
rejected by the en banc panel and all other Courts of Appeals that
have addressed this issue, this Court creates unevenness in
administration, unpredictability in litigation, and uncertainty as to
employee rights once thought well settled., 238 Based on the Court's
holding in Kentucky Retirement, future courts will be uncertain as to
what theory of liability to apply-disparate impact or disparate
treatment. Kentucky Retirement was an opportunity for the Court to
settle precedent and end the confusion among lower courts as to
which theory applies to claims of ADEA violations. Rather than
clarify the issue, however, the Court has encumbered the issue
further.
With regard to the potential applicability of a disparate impact
theory, the holding in Kentucky Retirement appears to contradict both
Hazen Paper and Smith, a contradiction that will undoubtedly
confuse lower courts' decision-making as to whether a violation of
the ADEA occurred. In Hazen Paper, the Court employed a
disparate treatment theory of liability in issuing its ruling but also
noted: "we have never decided whether a disparate impact theory of
liability is available under the ADEA and we need not do so here." 239
Thus, following the Court's ruling in Hazen Paper, the possibility of
a disparate impact theory being employed to assess an alleged
violation of the ADEA still existed. Similarly, in Smith, the Court
found that "there [was] nothing in [its] opinion in Hazen Paper that
237. See id. at 2365. The Kentucky Retirement Plan "permits those who
become seriously disabled but have not otherwise become eligible for retirement to
retire immediately and receive 'disability retirement' benefits." Id. at 2364.
However, if an employee becomes disabled after becoming eligible to receive his
pension, he will not get the same "disability retirement" benefits as younger, non-
pension eligible employees. See id. at 2364-65.
238. Id. at 2372 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
239. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 610 (citation omitted).
preclude[d] an interpretation of the ADEA that parallels [the] holding
in Griggs.,, 240 Furthermore, the Court stated: "[W]e think the history
of the enactment of the ADEA, with particular reference to the Wirtz
Report, supports the pre-Hazen Paper consensus concerning
disparate-impact liability." 24 1 In Kentucky Retirement, however, the
Court was faced with a statute that was facially discriminatory and
failed to find a violation of the ADEA.242 This failure demonstrates
the Court's apparent belief that a disparate impact theory is not
available for claims of an ADEA violation. By failing to allow a
disparate impact theory of analysis, the Court controverts its own
established precedent and blazes a befuddling trail for subsequent
lower courts facing alleged ADEA violations to follow.
The majority, in recognizing the confusion it created through its
ruling, attempts to limit its holding. 243 However, "it does so in ways
not permitted by statute or ... previous employment discrimination
cases." 244  In Kentucky Retirement, the majority asserts that the
policy is not facially discriminatory because "age is not the sole
determining factor of pension eligibility," but rather is one of many
factors contributing to the determination. 245  In drawing this
distinction, the majority contradicts prior ADEA cases, since no prior
ADEA case has ever suggested "that discrimination based on a
protected trait is permissible if the protected trait is one among many
variables., 246 This contradiction will undoubtedly make it difficult
for future courts addressing claims of ADEA violations to know how
240. Smith, 544 U.S. at 238. The Court in Griggs followed a disparate impact
theory of liability. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430.
241. Smith, 544 U.S. at 238.
242. Under the disparate impact theory of liability, a facially discriminatory
statute would violate the ADEA. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 609. Similarly, no
proof of a discriminatory motive or intent is required. Id.
243. Ky. Ret., 128 S. Ct. at 2376 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy
writes in his dissent that "[t]he Court recognizes some of the difficulties with its
position and seeks to limit its holding." Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
244. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
245. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
246. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Additionally, Justice Kennedy notes that
the Court's limited holding contradicts Title VII jurisprudence since there is no
indication in Title VII precedent that indicates it would be permissible for an
employer to discriminate based on age so long as age is not the only factor used in
determining benefits. See id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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to apply this limited holding. Likewise, subsequent lower courts will
be uncertain when it comes to analyzing claims of ADEA violations
that involve employment policies and practices that use age as a
factor in determining benefits when age is only one of a number of
factors.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Kentucky Retirement, the Court employed a disparate
treatment theory of liability to find that, because Kentucky did not
intend for its retirement system to discriminate against older workers,
the Plan did not violate the ADEA.247 Furthermore, the Court added
that because age was just one factor in determining pension
eligibility, it could not be asserted that the policy was "'actually
motivated' by age." 248 In its use of a disparate treatment theory of
liability when age is used as a factor in determining benefits for older
employees, the Court in Kentucky Retirement cast serious doubt
about when and where a disparate impact theory of liability can be
applied. Writing for the majority, Justice Breyer attempts to assert
that the decision in Kentucky Retirement in no way affects the
application of a disparate impact theory since Kentucky's retirement
system is not facially discriminatory.2 49 Justice Kennedy, however,
disagrees and believes that the Plan is facially discriminatory. 250 He
warns that by not employing the disparate impact theory of liability,
the majority in Kentucky Retirement has set dangerous precedent for
future cases involving violations of the ADEA in which a disparate
impact theory will no longer be available to employees seeking to
prove a violation.251
247. Id. at 2369-70.
248. Id. at 2370.
249. Id. at 2370. Justice Breyer believes that because age is only one factor in
determining pension eligibility and not the only factory, Kentucky's retirement
system is not facially discriminatory. Id.
250. See id. at 2371-72 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy believes
that whenever a policy or retirement system treats older workers and younger
workers differently, that policy or system is not facially neutral. See id. at 2371.
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). Further, he asserts that whenever age is used as a factor
in determining benefits, regardless of how many other factors are used, the ADEA
is violated. Id. at 2376 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
251. See id. at 2371-77 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Balancing the impact the Kentucky Retirement holding will have
on United States employers with the impact it will have on United
States employees really involves the balancing of two much more
meaningful elements: money and employee rights, specifically those
of older employees. The holding here represents a victory for
employers and their finances while conjointly demonstrating a clear
lack of regard for the ADEA and the older employees the ADEA was
enacted to protect. 25
2
During this time of economic crisis, is it any surprise the Court
ruled as it did? With countless companies filing for bankruptcy and
even more reporting shockingly low fourth quarter earnings, the
Supreme Court likely did not want to place any more financial strain
or burden on companies and their respective retirement plans.25 3
While the Supreme Court undoubtedly had the best of intentions,
Justice Kennedy noted in his dissenting opinion that, regardless of
the majority's intentions, "[t]he Court today ignores established rules
for interpreting and enforcing one of the most important statutes
Congress has enacted to protect the Nation's work force from age
discrimination., 254 In interpreting the ADEA as it did, the Supreme
Court allows employers to discriminate based on age under the guise
of "pension status." Should those employees who chose to work
passed the age of retirement eligibility be punished for that decision?
Should they have a statute designed to protect them construed against
them?
Regardless of the nation's current economic state, the rights
guaranteed to all older United States employees should not be
denigrated simply because enforcing those rights would be
detrimental to companies and their respective retirement policies.2 5
The rights held by every United State citizen-of every age-
guaranteed by the Constitution, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, and even the ADEA are paramount to all else and should be
protected as such. The right to be free of age discrimination in the
workplace as granted by the ADEA is particularly important because
252. See Cozza, supra note 1.
253. See Mutikani, supra note 225.
254. Ky. Ret., 128 S. Ct. at 2371 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
255. See Brief of the National Ass'n of State Retirement Administrators, et al.
as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 4, Kentucky Retirement Systems v.
EEOC, 128 S. Ct. 2361 (2008) (No. 06-1037).
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it is a right that will benefit the vast majority of working Americans
at some point during their lifetimes. This right against age
discrimination is one the Court should strive to protect by strictly
adhering to the language of the ADEA as dictated by precedent256
and as advocated by Justice Kennedy and his fellow dissenting
Justices. 25
7
256. See Smith, 544 U.S. at 238 (advocating the applicability of a disparate
impact theory for claims of ADEA violations).
257. See Ky. Ret., 128 S. Ct. at 2371-72 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
